We study the complexity of deciding the existence of mixed equilibria for minimization games where players use valuations other than expectation to evaluate their costs. We consider risk-averse players seeking to minimize the sum V = E + R of expectation E and a risk valuation R of their costs; R is non-negative and vanishes exactly when the cost incurred to a player is constant over all choices of strategies by the other players. In a V-equilibrium, no player could unilaterally reduce her cost.
• Two players: Deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium is strongly N P-hard when choosing R as (1) γ · Var, or (2) γ · SD, where γ > 0 is the risk-coefficient, or choosing V as (3) a convex combination of E + γ · Var and the concave ν-valuation ν −1 (E(ν(·))), where ν(x) = x r , with r ≥ 2. This is a concrete consequence of a general strong N Phardness result that only needs the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property and a few additional properties for V; its proof involves a reduction with a single parameter, which can be chosen efficiently so that each valuation satisfies the additional properties.
1 Introduction
The Pros and Cons of Expectation
In a game, each player is using a mixed strategy, a probability distribution over her strategies; her cost depends on the choices of all players and is evaluated by a valuation: a function from probability distributions to reals. The most prominent valuation in Non-Cooperative Game
Theory is expectation; each player minimizes her expected cost.
A drawback of expectation is that it may not accomodate risk and its impact on strategic decision; this inadequacy of expectation was addressed as early as 1738 by Bernoulli [4] . Indeed, risk-averse players [1] are willing to accept a larger amount of payment rather than gambling and taking the risk of a larger cost; according to [15] , "a risk-averse player is willing to pay something for certainty". So, valuations other than expectation have been sought (cf. [1, 10, 21, 27] ).
Concave valuations, such as variance and standard deviation, are well-suited to model riskaverse minimizing players. Already in 1906, Fisher [14] proposed attaching standard deviation to expectation as an additive measure of risk.
In his seminal paper [21] , Markowitz introduced the Mean-Variance approach to portfolio maximization, advocating the minimization of variance constrained on some lower bound on the expected return. This way, instead of a single optimal solution, a class of "efficient" solutions, termed as the Efficient frontier [10] , is defined, incurring the lowest risk for a given level of expected return. Popular valuations for determining a single maximizing solution from the Efficient frontier are (i) E − γ · Var, where E and Var stand for expectation and variance, respectively, and γ > 0 describes the risk tolerance (see [10] ), and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio SR = E/SD [27] , where SD stands for standard deviation. The Mean-Variance paradigm [21] created Modern Portfolio Theory [10] as a new field and initiated a tremendous amount of researchsee the surveys [20, 28] for an overview. However, in the Mean-Variance paradigm [21] , only expectation and variance were used for evaluating the return; this choice is justified only if the return is normally distributed [17] . Subsequently this inadequacy led to risk models involving higher moments so as to accomodate returns with a more general distribution [19] .
We now switch back to the minimization setting. A significant advantage of expectation is that it guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium [24, 25] , where each player is playing a best-response mixed strategy and could not unilaterally reduce her expected cost. Existence of equilibria (for minimization games) extends to convex valuations [8, 11] , but may fail for non-convex and even for concave ones. Crawford's game [7, Section 4] was the first counterexample game with no equilibrium for a certain valuation; for more counterexamples, see [9, 22] . The view that mixed equilibria get "endangered" in games where players are not expectationoptimizers has been put forward in [7] and adopted further in [12, 22] .
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12] introduced the equilibrium computation problem in games where risk-averse players use valuations more general than expectation, and addressed the complexity of deciding the existence of such equilibria. * Subsequently, Mavronicolas and Monien [22] focused on the concave valuation expectation plus variance, for which they established structural and complexity results for their introduced class of player-specific scheduling games [22, Section 3] ; their results provided a solid basis for the study of more general concave valuations.
Valuations More General than Expectation
In this work, we shall consider minimization games. We model the valuation of each player as the sum V = E + R, where E and R are the expectation and risk valuation, respectively. The formulation of (E + R)-valuations draws motivation from the Mean-Variance paradigm [21] , and from the Variance Principle and the Standard Deviation Principle, two standard premium principles in Actuarial Risk Theory (cf. [18, Section 5.3] ), by which V = E + γ · Var (resp., V = E+γ ·SD), where γ > 0 is the risk-coefficient. We focus on the associated decision problem, denoted as ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM, asking, given a game G, whether G has a V-equilibrium, where no player could unilaterally reduce her cost (as evaluated by V). What is the impact of properties of V on the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM? † We stipulate a very basic property for R, called Risk-Positivity: the value of R is nonnegative, en par with the Non-negative Loading property of the premium principles in [18, Section 5.3.1]; it is 0, yielding no risk, exactly when the cost incurred to a player is constant over all choices of strategies by the other players.
We shall focus on concave valuations. A key property of a concave valuation, called OptimalValue, we prove and exploit is that it maintains the same optimal value over all convex combinations of strategies supported in a given best-response mixed strategy (Proposition 3.1).
Unfortunately, unlike Var, moments of order higher than 2 are not concave. But on the positive side, all even moments have the Risk-Positivity property. Besides, recent work in Portfolio Theory [19] motivates using higher moments to model risk.
To obtain an enhanced class of interesting concave valuations, we introduce into the context of equilibrium computation valuations prominent for evaluating risk in Actuarial Risk Theory, which are transferred from the Mean Value Principle (see [18, Section 5.3] ). Specifically, we shall consider ν-valuations of the form V ν = ν −1 (E(ν(·))), for any increasing and strictly convex function ν, so that ν −1 is concave. ‡ It is good news that for ν increasing and strictly convex, R ν := V ν − E has the Risk-Positivity property (Lemma 2.1); so, V ν is an (E + R)-valuation.
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation and E-Strict Concavity
As our main tool, we shall exploit the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property [22, Section 2.6]: all strategies supported in a player's best-response mixed strategy induce the same conditional expectation, taken over all random choices of the other players, for her cost; thus, the player is holding a unique expectation for her cost no matter which of her supported strategies she ends up choosing. This property holds vacuously for Nash equilibria [24, 25] . The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property formalizes the most natural intuition for the players' expectations; hence, it is a very natural property to seek and employ in the setting of risk.
We aim at an enhanced class of valuations with the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
We introduce an E-strictly concave valuation as a concave valuation which, viewed as a function of a single mixed strategy, fulfills the definition of a strictly concave function for any pair of mixed strategies inducing different expectations (Definition 2.2). We observe that a convex combination of an E-strictly concave valuation and a concave valuation is E-strictly concave (Corollary 2.2); furthermore, Var and SD are E-strictly concave (Lemma 2.3). Hence, a wide class of concrete instances of E-strictly concave valuations results by plugging in the convex combination (i) E+γ ·Var for an E-strictly concave valuation, with γ > 0, and (ii) a ν-valuation, with an increasing and strictly convex function ν, for a concave valuation (Corollary 2.4). We establish the key fact that every E-strictly concave valuation has the Weak-Equilibrium-forExpectation property (Proposition 3.2). E-strictly concave valuations make the largest subclass of concave valuations we know of with the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
An obstacle to extending the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property to moments of order higher than 2 is their non-concavity. Instead we consider concave linear sums of even moments. (Even order is needed to guarantee the Risk-Positivity property.) We use the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) to establish that such concave valuations have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.4); this property renders such concave linear sums of even moments sufficiently interesting to consider.
Complexity Results for More General Valuations
By exploiting the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for an (E + R)-valuation V, we shall show the strong N P-hardness of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM for the two simplest cases: games with ‡ For the special case ν(x) = e x , V ν corresponds to the moment generating function (cf. [18, Section 2.4]) and has gained special attention as the Exponential Principle premium in Actuarial Risk Theory [18, Section 5.3] .
two strategies and games with two players; these are the first complexity results for deciding the existence of equilibria in the context of risk-modeling valuations (cf. Section 1.5).
Two Strategies
We discover that the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is captured by player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links [22, Section 5. show that for an (E + R)-valuation V, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly N P-hard for the class of player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links when R is (1) Var, or (2) SD, or (3) a concave linear sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} (Theorem 4.6).
Instrumental to the proof of Theorem 4.6 is the key property we show that a concave linear sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} enjoys the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property: each player i either is pure or has all of her neighbors (that is, players i ′ with ω(i, i ′ , 1) = 0) pure (Proposition 4.3). This property is a quantitative expression of the view that mixed equilibria get "endangered" when players are not expectation-optimizers (cf. [7, 12, 22] ).
The class of concave linear sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} is the largest class of valuations we were able to identify with the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property. We conjecture that every concave linear sum of even moments enjoys the property.
Two Players
We show that ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly N P-hard when V is an (E + R)-valuation V with the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property provided that there is a polynomial time computable δ, 0 < δ ≤ 1 4 , such that three additional conditions hold (Theorem 5.1); the requirement that δ be polynomial time computable stems from the fact that δ enters the reduction as a parameter. The first two such conditions ((2/a) and (2/b)) stipulate a particular inequality and a particular monotonicity property, respectively. The third condition (2/c) refers to the Crawford game G C (δ), a generalization of a bimatrix game from [7, Section 4] , whose bimatrix involves δ; it is required that G C (δ) has no V-equilibrium. The game G C (δ) is used as a "gadget" in the reduction. The proof of Theorem 5.1, involving a reduction with a single parameter δ, is § In the well-known model of weighted congestion games with player-specific latency functions [23] , each weighted player may use a different, player-specific cost function of the total weight on her selected link; in this model, it is the weights that are player-specific, while each cost function is the identity one.
very general since it refers to no particular valuation but to a class of valuations enjoying two natural properties, Risk-Positivity and Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation.
Concrete strong N P-hardness results follow as instantiations of Theorem 5.1 for three particular valuations (1) V = E+γ ·Var, (2) V = E+γ ·SD, and (3) V = λ·(E + γ · Var)+(1−λ)·V ν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is the increasing and strictly convex function ν(x) = x r , with r ≥ 2, and with γ > 0 (Theorem 5.12). For all three valuations in Theorem 5.12, we prove that the three additional conditions in Theorem 5.1 hold. In particular, for Condition (2/c), we prove that G C (δ) has no V-equilibrium for any value 0 < δ < 1; for the valuation (3), this holds in the more general case ν is any increasing and strictly convex function (Lemma 5.11).
Summary, Significance and Related Work
For a concave valuation V, there may or may not exist a V-equilibrium; we have identified V ν , with an increasing and strictly convex function ν, as an example of a concave valuation V for which every game has a V-equilibrium (cf. Section 5). However, restricting to a strictly concave valuation excludes the existence of a mixed V-equilibrium. Restricting instead to an E-strictly concave valuation V, a mixed V-equilibrium may or may not exist; what this work is revealing is that it then becomes strongly N P-hard to decide if there is one already for the two simplest cases, games with two strategies or two players (Theorems 4.6, 5.1 and 5.12).
While bringing concave valuations from Actuarial Risk Theory [18] into play, our framework encompasses general classes of (E + R)-valuations, assuming the Risk-Positivity property, that also enjoy the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, and a few additional properties. The (E + Var)-equilibria on which [12, 22] focused are a special case of our general framework.
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12, Theorem 5] presented a proof sketch to claim that it is N P-hard to decide the existence of an (E + Var)-equilibrium for games with two players; unfortunately, their proof had been flawed, containing several gaps and errors. In personal communication with Fiat and Papadimitriou [13] , they state: "The proof, as is, has gaps and errors, which we believe can be fixed to yield a proof with the same architecture, but we have not done it yet." In lack of a proof, the complexity of deciding the existence of an (E + Var)-equilibrium for games with two players has remained open, and Theorems 5.1 and 5.12 represent new results, with Theorem 5.12 encompassing (E + Var)-equilibria as a special case. Our reduction adapts techniques originally used by Conitzer and Sandholm [6, Section 3] to show that deciding the existence of Nash equilibria with certain properties for games with two players is N P-complete.
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12, Section 2] coined a notion termed as strict concavity, denoted here as FP-strict concavity, which is similar to but different than E-strict concavity. It turns out that their difference is essential since E + Var is not FP-strictly concave while it is E-strictly concave. ¶ In fact, no concrete example of an FP-strictly concave valuation was given in [12] . It was known that E + Var, as well as E + SD, have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property [22, Theorem 3.5]; they were also known to have the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property for player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links [22, Theorem 5.13] . It was established in [5, Theorem 4] that there is always a correlated equilibrium [2] for E + Var.
Paper Organization
Section 2 presents the game-theoretic framework and introduces (E + R)-valuations and E-strict concavity. Equilibria and their properties are articulated in Section 3. The N P-hardness results for two strategies and two players are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude, in Section 6, with a discussion of the results and some open problems.
2 Games, (E + R)-Valuations and E-Strict Concavity
Games
For an integer n ≥ 2, an n-players game G, or game, consists of (i) n finite sets {S i } i∈[n] of strategies, and (ii) n cost functions {µ i } i∈ [n] , each mapping S = × i∈[n] S i to the reals. So, µ i (s) is the cost of player i ∈ [n] on the profile s = s 1 , . . . , s n of strategies, one per player.
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution p i on S i ; the support of player
Denote as ∆ i = ∆(S i ) the set of mixed strategies for player i. Player i is pure if for each strategy s i ∈ S i , p i (s i ) ∈ {0, 1}; else she is non-pure.
Denote as p ℓ i the pure strategy of player i choosing the strategy ℓ with probability 1.
A mixed profile is a tuple p = p 1 , . . . , p n of n mixed strategies, one per player; denote as
∆ i the set of mixed profiles. The mixed profile p induces probabilities p(s) for each profile s ∈ S with p(s)
, the partial profile s −i (resp., partial mixed profile p −i ) results by eliminating the strategy s i (resp., the mixed strategy ¶ See the Appendix for the definition of FP-strict concavity and a proof that E + Var is not FP-strictly concave.
See Section 3.4 for the definition of Mean-Variance Preference Functions and their relation to this work. p i ) from s (resp., p). The partial mixed profile p −i induces probabilities p(s −i ) for each partial
A function V : T → R on a convex set T is concave (resp., strictly concave) if for any two points t 1 , t 2 ∈ T and any number δ ∈ [0, 1] (resp., δ ∈ (0, 1)),
on a convex set T is convex (resp., strictly convex) if −V is concave (resp., strictly concave).
(E + R)-Valuations
For a player i ∈ [n], a valuation function, or valuation for short, V i is a real-valued function on ∆(S), yielding a value V i (p) to each mixed profile p, so that in the special case where p is a
. . , V n is a tuple of valuations, one per player; G V denotes G together with V. * * We now introduce a special class of valuations. For each integer k ≥ 0, the k-moment valuation is given by
for each player i ∈ [n]; so, 1M = 0. Furthermore, 2M, known as variance and denoted as Var, is concave; hence, also is the square root of variance, known as standard deviation and denoted as SD. However, k-moments of order higher than 2 are not concave.
We shall consider ν-valuations V ν = ν −1 (E(ν(.))), for an increasing and strictly convex function ν; so, ν −1 , and hence V ν , is concave. So, for a player i,
set also R ν := V ν − E. We observe: Lemma 2.1 For an increasing and strictly convex function ν, the risk valuation R ν has the Risk-Positivity property. * * We shall mostly treat a valuation function Vi and a valuation V interchangeably for an easier notation; we shall use Vi only when pi has some special property. 
if and only if (since ν is increasing)
Now (C.1) follows since ν is convex; (C.2) follows since ν is strictly convex.
By Lemma 2.1, for an increasing and strictly convex function ν, V ν is an (E + R)-valuation.
We shall deal with cases where for a player i ∈ [n] and a mixed profile p, {µ i (s) | p(s) > 0} = {a, b} with a < b, so that R i (p) depends on the three parameters a, b and q, where
E-Strict Concavity
We introduce a refinement of concavity:
Definition 2.2 (E-Strict Concavity) Fix a player i. The (E + R)-valuation V i is Estrictly concave if for every game G, the following conditions hold for a fixed partial mixed profile p −i :
(1) V i is concave in the mixed strategy p i .
(2) For a pair of mixed strategies
, then for any λ with 0 < λ < 1,
Note that E-strict concavity is different from the strict concavity formulated in [12, Section 2], and denoted here as FP-strict concavity, by using the payoff distribution P i , which is the probability distribution on the costs induced by a mixed strategy p i and a partial mixed profile p −i . † † A closure property of E-strict concavity follows. † † In Appendix A, we provide a counterexample to demonstrate that the valuation E + Var is not FP-strictly concave.
Corollary 2.2
Fix an arbitrary pair of an E-strictly concave valuation V (1) and a concave valuation V (2) . Then, for any λ, with 0 < λ ≤ 1,
We observe:
The valuations E + γ · Var and E + γ · SD, with γ > 0, are E-strictly concave.
Proof: Fix a game G and a player i ∈ [n]. Recall that Var and SD are concave in the mixed strategy p i . Also,
so, the non-linear term in the mixed strategy p i is a function in the variables
Since the function ν(x) = −x 2 is strictly concave, we get that
as needed. Now, SD is E-strictly concave as the square root of Var.
By Corollary 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, it follows:
where ν is increasing and strictly convex, and with γ > 0, is E-strictly concave.
Equilibria and Their Properties 3.1 V-Equilibrium
Fix a player i ∈ [n]. The pure strategy p ℓ i is a V i -best pure response to a partial mixed profile
so, the pure strategy p ℓ i minimizes the valuation V i (., p −i ) of player i over her pure strategies. The mixed strategy p i is a V i -best response to p −i if
so, the mixed strategy p i minimizes the valuation V i (., p −i ) of player i over her mixed strategies.
The mixed profile p is a V-equilibrium if for each player i, the mixed strategy p i is a V i -best response to p −i ; so, no player could unilaterally deviate to another mixed strategy to reduce her cost. Denote as ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM the algorithmic problem of deciding, given a game G, the existence of a V-equilibrium for G V .
The Optimal-Value Property
We show:
Denote as ∆ (σ ( p i )) the set of mixed strategies for player i with supports contained in σ ( p i );
this line segment to some strategy q i ∈ ∆ (σ ( p i )) with q i = p i so that p i is an interior point on the line segment connecting q i and q i . The extension is possible since p i (j) > 0 for each
• p i is an interior point on the line segment connecting q i and q i .
A contradiction to the concavity of V i (., p −i ).
The Strong Equilibrium and Weak Equilibrium Properties
The mixed profile p has the Strong Equilibrium property [22, Section 2.6] for player i in the game G V if for each strategy ℓ ∈ σ(p i ),
so, each strategy in the support of player i is a V i -best pure response to the partial mixed profile 
The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation Property
We introduce: Definition 3.1 (The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation Property) The valuation V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if the following condition holds for every game G: For each player i ∈ [n], if p i is a V i -best-response to p −i , then p has the Weak Equilibrium property for player i in the game G E : for each pair of strategies
We now prove that E-strict concavity implies the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property:
where V i is E-strictly concave. Then, V has the WeakEquilibrium-for-Expectation property for player i.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that V does not have the Weak-Equilibrium-forExpectation property for player i. Then, there is a game G, a partial mixed profile p −i and a mixed strategy p i which is a V i -best-response to p −i such that for some strategies r, t ∈ σ(p i ),
Since V i is E-strictly concave, this implies that
Since V i is concave, the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) implies that
A contradiction.
By Lemma 2.3 and Corollary 2.4, Proposition 3.2 immediately implies:
where ν is increasing and strictly convex, and with γ > 0. Then, V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
We now turn to a particular concave valuation and exploit the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) to prove:
, and consider the concave valuation
property for player i.
Proof: Fix a game G. Clearly, for a mixed profile p,
, which is a polynomial of degree 2ℓ in p, and (ii) a polynomial of degree bounded by 2ℓ − 1 in p.
The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player i follows. 
(3) Fix a partial mixed profile p −i and a nonempty convex subset
So, a Mean-Variance Preference Function simultaneously generalizes and restricts the (E + R)-valuations; it generalizes sum to G but restricts R to Var. Note that Condition (3) in Definition 3.2 may be seen as a generalization of the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property conditioned on the assumption that
It is proved in [5 4 Two Strategies
Player-Specific Scheduling Games
A player-specific scheduling game [22, Section 3] is equipped with an integer weight ω(i, i ′ , ℓ)
for each triple of a player i ∈ [n], a player i ′ ∈ [n] and a strategy ℓ ∈ S i , also called link, with
, the cost function µ i is defined by
In a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links 1
We derive a combinatorial formula for the k-moment valuation of the cost of a player choosing a link ℓ in a player-specific scheduling game. The formula takes the form of a partition polynomial [3] : a multivariable polynomial defined by a sum over partitions of the integer k. The formula uses the function f :
Note that
The following simple claim follows by inspection.
Lemma 4.1
The function f has the following properties:
2. For an even integer j ≥ 2:
3. For an odd integer j ≥ 3:
We show: Proposition 4.2 Consider a player-specific scheduling game with n players. Then, for each player i ∈ [n], for a link ℓ ∈ [m] and a mixed profile p,
Proof: We shall first consider the special cases k = 0 and k = 1.
The case k = 0:
The formula has value
The case k = 1: Clearly,
The value of the formula is
since there is no term to add.
Assume now that k ≥ 2. The proof is by induction on the number of players n. For the basis case where n = 1, kM 1 (p ℓ 1 , .) = 0, and 0 is also the value given by the formula (since r 1 = 0 implies j r j = k, and there is no term to add).
Assume inductively that the formula holds for n − 1 players. For the induction step, we shall establish the formula for n players. Without loss of generality, fix i := 1. For simplicity, write p j and ω j for p j (ℓ) and ω(i, j, ℓ), respectively. For any integer t ≤ k, denote as p | t the restriction of p to the players 1, . . . , t; so,
By induction hypothesis, it follows that
Since f(p n , r n ) = 0 when r n = 1, it follows that
as needed. By Lemma 4.1,
Since j∈[n]\{i} r j = k and k is even, the number of odd r j 's is even, and this implies that
The Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors Property
We show: 
For the proof of Lemma 4.4, we shall employ a combinatorial Embracing Lemma (Lemma 4.5)
to establish that the k-moment valuation increases strictly monotone for k ∈ {6, 8}; it seems that a different technique is needed to extend Lemma 4.4 beyond k = 8.
Lemma 4.5 (Embracing Lemma) Fix a pair of odd integers r ≥ 3 and s ≥ 3. Fix probabilities p and q with 0 < p < 1 2 and 1 2 < q < 1. Fix a weight w and a pair of numbers α, β ∈ R + with α · β ≥ 1 2 . Then, the function
The Embracing Lemma establishes that a triple of "adjacent" partitions in the formula from Proposition 4.2 increases strictly monotone; intuitively, the terms corresponding to two of the partitions in the triple are positive and "help out" by embracing the third negative term to counterbalance its negative effect to increasing monotonicity.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4.5 uses an elementary observation:
Proof: The claim amounts to
which holds trivially.
We continue with the proof of the Embracing Lemma. Write
Note that a, b, c > 0. Clearly, .
We shall prove that h ′ (y) > 0 for all y ≥ 0. Clearly,
.
We now verify the latter condition. Note that
By Observation 4.1, it follows that
We now continue with the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Proof: If Condition (C.1) holds, then we are done. So, assume that Condition (C.1) does not hold, so that player i is mixed. If Condition (C.3) holds, then we are done. So, assume
that Condition (C.3) does not hold. Since player i is mixed, this implies that
We proceed by case analysis. The cases k = 2 and k = 4: By Proposition 4.2, for each link ℓ ∈ [2], 
, and
Since the two links are ordered, it follows that for each player j ∈ [n] \ {i}, f (p j (1), 2) = f (p j (1), 4) = 0, which implies that p j (1) = 1 and player j is pure, as needed for Condition
(C.2).
For the remaining cases k ∈ {6, 8}, we shall be establishing that kM i increases strictly monotone in the weights. Since the two links are ordered, the inequality kM i p 1 i , p −i ≥ kM i p 2 i , p −i implies that for each player j ∈ [n] \ {i} with ω(i, j, 1) = 0 and ω(i, j, 2) = 0, f (p j (1), r j ) = f (p j (1), r j ) = 0, which implies that p j (1) = 1 and player j is pure, as needed for Condition (C.2). We shall be referring again to the formula from Proposition 4.2.
The case k = 6: Note that 6 can be partitioned as 6, (4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4) and (2, 2, 2). The terms of the formula corresponding to the partitions 6 and (2, 2, 2) have strictly positive coefficients; so, they are increasing strictly monotone in the weights. Now group together the terms of the formula corresponding to the partitions with (r j , r k ) ∈ {(4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4)} in a single sum. Lemma 4.5 (with α = β = 1) implies that the sum increases strictly monotone in the weights.
The case k = 8: The only partitions of 8 that use odd numbers are (i) (5, 3) and (3, 5) , and (ii) (3, 3, 2), (3, 2, 3) and (2, 3, 3) . Partitions in (i) involve two strategies, while partitions in (ii) involve three strategies.
Case (i): Let j and k be the two strategies with 0 < p j (ℓ) < 
Consider now the terms of the formula corresponding to the partitions with (r j , r k ) ∈ {(6, 2), (5, 3), (4, 4), (3, 5) , (2, 6)} .
First group together the terms corresponding to the partitions with (r j , r k ) ∈ {(6, 2), (5, 3), (4, 4)} in a single sum, and invoke Lemma 4.5 with α = 1 and β = 1 2 ; it follows that the sum increases strictly monotone in the weights. Then, group together the terms corresponding to the partitions with (r j , r k ) ∈ {(2, 6), (3, 5) , (4, 4)} in a single sum, and invoke Lemma 4.5 with α = 1 and β = 1 2 ; it follows that the sum increases strictly monotone in the weights.
Case (ii): Let j, k and t be the three strategies with 0 < p j (1) < 1 2 and 1 2 < p k (1) < 1 for a link ℓ ∈ [2]; assume, without loss of generality, that 1 2
Consider now the terms of the formula corresponding to the partitions with (r j , r k , r t ) ∈ {(4, 2, 2), (3, 3, 2), (2, 4, 2), (3, 2, 3), (2, 2, 4)} .
In the same way as for Case (i), Lemma 4.5 implies that the sum of the terms corresponding to these partitions increases strictly monotone in the weights.
We continue with the proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider the k-moment valuation kM with k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. So, Lemma 4.4 applies. Assume, by way of contradiction, that Condition (C.3)
Hence, by Lemma 4.4, either (C.1) player i is pure, or (C.2) all players i ′ ∈ [n] \ {i} with ω(i, i ′ , 1) = 0 are pure.
N P-Hardness Result
We give an example of a player-specific scheduling game G with n = 3 players 0, 1 and 2 on two ordered links 1 and 2, with no V-equilibrium for an (E + R)-valuation V, where R is ( 
. By the definition of weights, a contradiction follows. Thus, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is non-trivial in the considered setting. We show: Theorem 4.6 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where R is (1) Var, or (2) SD, or (3) a concave linear sum k∈{2,4,6,8} α k · kM, with α k ≥ 0 for k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. Then, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly N P-hard for player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links.
The proof will use a reduction from MULTIBALANCED PARTITION, a problem we introduce and show strongly N P-complete:
n, m, A , with integers n, m and a set [k] → [q] giving the first, second and third coordinate, respectively, of each element m i ∈ M, we construct an instance n, m, A of MULTIBALANCED PARTITION as follows:
• n := k + 1 and m := 3q.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Proof: "⇒": Assume first that W, X, Y, M has a solution M ′ . Set
Then, clearly, for each j ∈ [m], i∈I ′ a ij = 1. Hence, for each j ∈ [m],
The reduction is very similar to the one used in the proof of [16, Theorem 3.5] .
Set now
so that I is a solution of n, m, A .
"⇐": Assume now that n, m, A has a solution I. We claim that k + 1 ∈ I: Assume, by way
a contradiction to the assumption that I is a solution of n, m, A . So, k + 1 ∈ I.
Fix now an arbitrary j ∈ [m]. Set ∆ j := i∈I\{k+1} a ij . Since I is a solution of n, m, A ,
Since k + 1 ∈ I, this implies that
Hence,
It follows that ∆ j = 1, so that I \ {k + 1} is a solution of W, X, Y, M .
Lemma 4.8 establishes the reduction for the N P-hardness; since the number involved in the reduction are polynomially bounded, strong N P-hardness follows.
For the proof of the reduction for Theorem 4.6, we shall use the Mixed-Player-Has-PureNeighbors property (Proposition 4.3) to identify the mixed players; in turn, we shall apply the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property to the mixed players to obtain a solution to MULTIBALANCED PARTITION or a V-equilibrium. We continue with the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Proof: We shall employ a reduction from MULTIBALANCED PARTITION. Given an instance n, m, A of MULTIBALANCED PARTITION, we construct an instance G of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM as follows. G is a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links with n + 5m players in the player set Π :
We assume that M ≥ 4. We now define the weights ω(π 1 , π 2 , ℓ) where π 1 , π 2 ∈ Π and ℓ ∈ [2] , where δ is the Kronecker delta: δ ℓℓ ′ = 1 if ℓ = ℓ ′ and 0 otherwise.
and j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}: Then,
Note that G is a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links. We now prove:
, there is an index j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} such that player [k, j] is non-pure. A contradiction to the assumption that p is a V-equilibrium.
We next prove: 
We proceed by case analysis.
Assume first that |Φ
1 | > |Φ 2 |. So, |Φ 1 | ≥ 3 and |Φ 2 | ≤ 1. Then, E π p 1 π , p −π ≥ 3 M − 4 y 1 > M + 1 − 4 y 2 ≥ E π p 2 π , p −π , since 3M > M + 5 ≥ M + 1 + 4 (y 1 − y 2 ). A contradiction.
Assume now that |Φ
3. Assume finally that |Φ 1 | = |Φ 2 |. Then,
and
The claim follows.
We are now ready to prove: 
The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4) implies that
By the choice of M , this implies that
Hence, I is a solution of n, m, A .
We finally prove:
Lemma 4.12 If n, m, A has a solution, then G has a V-equilibrium.
For the proof of Lemma 4.12, we shall use a particular monotonicity property of the risk valuation R = kM with an even integer k ≥ 2. Note that
This implies that all valuations R addressed in Theorem 4.6 incur R(a, b, q) which increases monotonically in b−a for a fixed probability q ∈ (0, 1). In fact, the function R(a, b, q) with a ≤ b is a function R(b − a, q) := R(a, b, q) in b − a; the function R(b − a, q) increases monotonically in b − a for a fixed q ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies R(b − a, q) = R(b − a, 1 − q). For the proof of Lemma 4.12, we shall refer to these two properties together as the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property.
We continue with the proof of Lemma 4.12.
Proof: Consider a solution I ⊂ [n] of n, m, A . Define a mixed profile p as follows:
• For each i ∈ [n], p i (1) := 1 if i ∈ I, and 0 otherwise.
We now prove that x can be chosen so that p is a V-equilibrium. We proceed by case analysis. • For r ∈ {0, 2}: A kr = 3M and B kr = 2M , so that
and, using the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
• For r ∈ {1, 3}: A kr = 3 (M + 1) and B kr = 2 (M + 1), so that
Consider now the cost of player [k, r] with r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} when she switches to the other link. Denote as p the corresponding mixed profile. As in the case of the mixed profile p, By the cost functions and the definition of p, we get:
• For r ∈ {0, 2}: C kr = 4 (M + 1) − 4 = 4M and D kr = 3 (M + 1) − 4 = 3M − 1, so that
• For r ∈ {1, 3}: C kr = 4M − 4 and D kr = 3M − 4, so that
We now determine a probability x ∈ (0, 1) so that for all players [k, r] with r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
• For r ∈ {0, 2}: Then,
if and only if
• For r ∈ {1, 3}: Then,
We shall determine a probability
Observe that h(0) = 0. Set
By the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
, then set x := x and we are done. If h( x) > 2M − 6, then the continuity of R implies that there is a probability x ∈ (0, x) such that 1 ≤ h( x) ≤ 2M − 6, and we are done. 
Since I is a solution of n, m, A , we get that
By the Risk-Positivity property, this implies that
Since p is a fully mixed profile (since 0 < x < 1) and V has the WeakEquilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4),
It follows from the case analysis that p is a V-equilibrium.
Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12 establish the reduction for the N P-hardness; since the numbers involved in the reduction are polynomially bounded, strong N P-hardness follows.
Two Players
Consider a concave valuation V ν , for an increasing and strictly convex function ν. Since ν −1 is also increasing, a mixed profile p is a V ν -equilibrium for a game G if and only if p is an E-equilibrium for the game G ν constructed from G by setting for each player i ∈ [n] and profile s ∈ S, µ ν i (s) := ν(µ i (s)). Since every game has an E-equilibrium [24, 25] , this implies that there is a V ν -equilibrium for G, and the associated search problem for a V ν -equilibrium is total; it is in PPAD [26] for 2-players games. Nevertheless, we shall show that there are other (concave) valuations V for which deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium is strongly N P-hard for 2-players games.
General N P-Hardness Result
(1) V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
(2) There is a polynomial time computable δ with 0 < δ ≤ 1 4 such that:
(2/c) The Crawford game G C (δ) with bimatrix 1 + δ, 1 + δ 1, 1 + 2δ
Then, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly N P-hard for 2-players games.
We present a general proof with a reduction involving the parameter δ from Condition (2), required to be polynomial time computable. The reduction uses the Crawford game G C (δ) as a "gadget"; for any δ with 0 < δ < 1, G C (δ) is an adapted generalization of a bimatrix game from [7, Section 4] . The parameter δ enters the reduction through G C (δ).
Specifically, the proof of Theorem 5.1 employs a reduction from SAT [16, L01] . An instance of SAT is a propositional formula φ in the form of a conjunction of clauses C = {c 1 , . . . , c k } over a set of variables V = {v 1 , . . . , v m }. Denote as L = {ℓ 1 , ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ m , ℓ m } the set of literals corresponding to the variables in V. We shall use lower-case letters c, c 1 , c 2 , . . ., v, v 1 , v 2 , . . ., and ℓ, ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , . . . to denote clauses from C, variables from V and literals from L, respectively.
We shall use the Crawford set F = {f 1 , f 2 } with two strategies f 1 and
The cost values are chosen judiciously so as to carefully assure or exclude the existence of a V-equilibrium. We continue with the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof: Given an instance φ of SAT, construct a game G = G(φ) = [2] , {S i } i∈ [2] , {µ i } i∈ [2] as follows. For each player i ∈ [2], S i := Λ ∪ F. The cost functions {µ i } i∈ [2] are given in Figure 1 . 
For a player
note that p i (F) + p i (Λ) = 1. We prove a sequence of technical claims: Crawford game G C (δ) has no V-equilibrium. Hence, it follows that p 2 (Λ) > 0. We proceed by case analysis on p 2 (F).
1. Assume first that p 2 (F) > 0; so, p 2 (Λ) < 1. Fix a strategy f ∈ F with p 2 (f) > 0. By the cost functions, µ 2 (f ′ , f) ≤ 1 + 2 δ < 2 for each strategy f ′ ∈ F. Hence, E 2 (p 1 , p f 2 ) < 2 since δ < 1 2 . Fix now a strategy λ ∈ Λ with p 2 (λ) > 0. By the cost functions, µ 2 (f 1 , λ) = 2 for each strategy f 1 ∈ F. Hence, E 2 (p 1 , p λ 2 ) = 2. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player 2,
2. Assume now that p 2 (F) = 0; so, p 2 (Λ) = 1. By the cost functions, µ 2 (f, λ) = 2 for each pair of strategies f ∈ F and λ ∈ Λ. Hence, E 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 2. It follows by the Risk-Positivity property that R 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0, so that V 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 2. Consider now player 2 switching to the strategy f 2 ∈ F. By Condition (2/a),
Thus,
so that
A contradiction to the assumption that p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium.
Proof: Set i := 1 so that p 1 (Λ) = 1. By Lemma 5.2, p 2 (Λ) > 0. If p 2 (Λ) = 1, then we are done. So assume p 2 (Λ) < 1. This implies that p 2 (F) > 0.
By the cost functions, for each strategy f ∈ F, µ 2 (λ, f) = 1 for each strategy λ ∈ Λ. Hence,
= 1, so that the Weak-Equilibriumfor-Expectation property for player 2 implies that E 2 p 1 , p λ 2 = 1 for each strategy λ ∈ Λ with p 2 (λ) > 0, and (ii) R 2 (p 1 , p f 2 ) = 0, by the Risk-Positivity property. Hence, V 2 p 1 , p f 2 = 1. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a strategy λ ′ ∈ Λ with p 2 (λ ′ ) > 0 such that µ 2 (λ, λ ′ ) = 1 for some λ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0. It follows by the Risk-Positivity property that
Since V 2 p 1 , p f 2 = 1, player 2 improves her cost by switching to a strategy f ∈ F. A contradiction to the assumption that p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium.
Hence, it follows that µ 2 (λ, λ ′ ) = 1 for each pair of strategies λ, λ ′ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0 and p 2 (λ ′ ) > 0. By the cost functions, it follows that for each pair of distinct strategies λ, λ ′ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0 and
Consider now player 1. Note that for each strategy λ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0, (i) µ 1 (λ, λ ′ ) = 1 for each strategy λ ′ ∈ Λ with p 2 (λ ′ ) > 0, and (ii) µ 1 (λ, f) = 2 for each strategy f ∈ F with 1, 2, q) , where q = p 2 (F).
Consider player 1 switching to the pure strategy p f 1 1 . By the cost functions, µ 1 (f 1 , λ) = 1 for each strategy λ ∈ Λ, µ 1 (f 1 , f 2 ) = 1 and
So, player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy p 
So,
So, there is a player i ∈ [2] with
Without loss of generality, set i := 1. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player 1,
, p 2 for all λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ 1 ) > 0 and p 1 (λ 2 ) > 0. For λ ∈ Λ, it holds that
for all λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ 1 ) > 0 and p 1 (λ 2 ) > 0. Hence, it follows that for each λ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0,
But for each strategy f ∈ F with p 1 (f) > 0,
for some a with |a| < 2. Hence, the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player 1 implies that
We now establish some stronger properties for a V-equilibrium.
there is a player i ∈ [2] such that E i (Λ, Λ) ≥ 1. For easier notation, take i := 1.
By the cost functions, for each λ ∈ Λ, µ 1 (f 1 , λ) = 1. If player 1 switches to the pure strategy
1 , p 2 ) = 0, by the Risk-Positivity property. Since R 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) ≥ 0 (by the Risk-Positivity property), it follows that if either E 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) > 1 or R 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) > 0, then player 1 improves her cost by switching to p f 1 1 . Since p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium, it follows that both E 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 1 and R 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0.
In the same way as above, E 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 1 and R 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 follow. By the cost functions, for each pair λ, λ ′ ∈ Λ, µ 1 (λ, λ ′ ) + µ 1 (λ, λ ′ ) ≥ 2. We have just
shown that E 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) + E 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 2. This implies that µ 1 (λ, λ ′ ) = µ 2 (λ, λ ′ ) = 1 for each pair λ, λ ′ ∈ Λ with p 1 (λ) > 0 and p 2 (λ ′ ) > 0. Thus, by the cost functions, λ, λ ′ ∈ L, so that p 1 (L) = p 2 (L) = 1, and p i (λ) > 0 implies that p i (λ) = 0 for all pairs of a player i ∈ [2] and a literal λ ∈ L.
We continue to prove:
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a player i ∈ [2] and a literal ℓ ∈ L such that p i (ℓ) = p i (ℓ) = 0. Without loss of generality, set i := 2. Recall that, by Lemma 5.5,
Consider player 1 switching to the pure strategy p v 1 for the variable v such that ℓ and ℓ are literals for v. By the cost functions, µ 1 (v, λ) = m if λ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ}, and 0 if λ ∈ L \ {ℓ, ℓ}.
Since p 2 (L) = 1 and p 2 (ℓ) = p 2 (ℓ) = 0, it follows that µ 1 (v, λ) = 0 for all strategies λ with
(by the Risk-Positivity property). Hence, V 1 (p v 1 , p 2 ) = 0, so that player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy p v 1 . A contradiction to the assumption that p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium.
Finally, we prove:
Lemma 5.7 A V-equilibrium p 1 , p 2 for G induces a unique truth assignment for φ.
Proof: For each pair of a player i ∈ [2] and a literal ℓ ∈ L, it holds that (i) p 1 (ℓ) + p 1 (ℓ) > 0 (by Lemma 5.6), and (ii) if p i (ℓ) > 0, then p i (ℓ) = 0 (by Lemma 5.5). Thus, for each variable v, there is a literal ℓ for v such that p 1 (ℓ), p 2 (ℓ) > 0 and p 1 (ℓ) = p 2 (ℓ) = 0.
We are now ready to prove: Lemma 5.8 φ is satisfiable if and only if G(φ) has a V-equilibrium.
Proof: "⇐:" Assume first that φ is not satisfiable. Assume, by way of contradiction, that G(φ) has a V-equilibrium p 1 , p 2 . By Lemma 5.7, p 1 , p 2 induces a unique truth assignment γ for φ. Since φ is not satisfiable, there is a clause c such that for each literal ℓ with p 1 (ℓ), p 2 (ℓ) > 0, ℓ ∈ c. Consider now player 1 switching to the pure strategy p c 1 . Then,
and R 1 (p c 1 , p 2 ) = 0 (by the Risk-Positivity property), so that V 1 (p c 1 , p 2 ) = 0. By Lemma 5.5, V 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 1. So, player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy p c 1 . A contradiction to the assumption that p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium.
"⇒:" Assume now that φ is satisfiable. For a satisfying assignment γ of φ, set p i (ℓ) := 1 m for each literal ℓ ∈ L with γ(ℓ) = 1. We shall prove that p 1 , p 2 is a V-equilibrium. Fix a player i ∈ [2] . By the cost functions, µ i (ℓ j , ℓ k ) = 1 for each pair of literals ℓ j , ℓ k with p 1 (ℓ j )·p 2 (ℓ k ) > 0. Hence, the Risk-Positivity property implies that R i (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0. Furthermore,
So, player i may decrease V i only if she decreases E i . It suffices to prove that player i cannot decrease E i by switching to a pure strategy. We proceed by case analysis.
1. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy p v 1 for a variable v ∈ V with literals ℓ, ℓ. By the cost functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µ i (v, λ) = m if λ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ} and 0 otherwise. By construction,
2. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy p c i for a clause c ∈ C. By the cost functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µ i (c, λ) = m if λ ∈ c and 0 otherwise. Since φ is satisfiable, there is at least one literal ℓ ∈ c with γ(ℓ) = 1; hence, by construction of p i , there is at least one literal ℓ ∈ c with p i (ℓ) = 1 m . Thus,
3. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy p f i for some f ∈ F. By construction of the cost functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µ i (f, ℓ) = 1. It follows that
4. Finally, consider player i switching to the pure strategy p ℓ i for some literal ℓ ∈ L. Assume first that γ(ℓ) = 1. Then, p i (ℓ) = 0. Hence, by the cost functions, µ i (ℓ, ℓ ′ ) = 1 for each literal ℓ ′ ∈ L with p i (ℓ) > 0. It follows that E i p ℓ i , p i = 1. Assume now that γ(ℓ) = 0. Then, p i (ℓ) = 1 m . By the cost functions, µ i (ℓ, ℓ) = 2 and µ i (ℓ, ℓ ′ ) = 1 for ℓ ′ ∈ L \ {ℓ} with p i (ℓ ′ ) > 0. It follows that
The claim now follows.
Lemma 5.8 establishes the reduction for the N P-hardness; since the numbers involved in the reduction are polynomially bounded, strong N P-hardness follows.
Concrete N P-Hardness Result
We remark that the proof of the reduction for Theorem 5.1 is modular in treating V in an abstract way through using Risk-Positivity, Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation, and the properties in Condition (2). This modularity yields an extension of Theorem 5.1 to concrete (E + R)-valuations enjoying these properties. We shall verify Conditions (1) and (2) from Theorem 5.1 for the (E + R)-valuations V, where and (2/c), respectively. We start with Condition (2/a). We remark that the existence of a δ such that R(1, 1 + 2δ, q) < 1 2 for each probability q ∈ [0, 1] follows already from the continuity of R; but its polynomial time computation is bound to depend on each particular R. We prove: Lemma 5.9 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3) V = λ (E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ) V ν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν(x) = x r with r ≥ 2, and with γ > 0. Then, there is a polynomial time computable ∆ with 0 < ∆ ≤ 1 4 such that R(1, 1 + 2δ, q) < 1 2 for all q ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ δ < ∆.
Proof: For each valuation V, we shall choose a suitable ∆.
(1) R = γ · Var: Then, γ · R (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = γ · q(1 − q) · 4δ 2 ≤ γ · 1 4 · 4δ 2 = γ · δ 2 . Choose ∆ as a rational number no larger than 1 4 · min 1 √ γ , 1 . This choice satisfies that for each δ < ∆, γ · δ 2 < 1 2 .
(2) R = γ · SD: Then, γ · R (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = γ · q(1 − q) · 2δ ≤ γ · 1 2 · 2δ = γ · δ. Choose ∆ := 1 4 · min 1 γ , 1 . This choice satisfies that for each δ < ∆, γ · δ < 1 2 .
(3) V = λ(E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)V ν where ν(x) = x r with r ≥ 2: Consider first the risk valuation R = V ν − E, where ν(x) = x r with r ≥ 2. Note that R (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = r q · (1 + 2δ)) r + (1 − q) − 1 − q · (2δ) .
Set ∆ := 1 4 . Then, for every δ < ∆, the fact that R (1, 1 + 2δ, q) increases monotonically in δ implies that For q ≤ 1 2 , the argument is identical to the one for Case (1) . Consider now q > 1 2 , and set again ∆ := min 1 4 , 1 2(1 + γ)
. Denote again A := 1 + δ(2q + γ). By arguments identical to those for Case (1), we derive that V(1, 1 + 2δ, r) < A and A ≤ q + 1 < V(1, 2, q).
Case ( Set ∆ := 1 4 . Since r ≤ q, ν is strictly increasing and 1 + 2δ < 2 for δ < ∆, the last inequality holds, and we are done.
Combined with the choice of ∆ for (1), the required property for the convex combination with γ > 0. Then, for any δ, 0 < δ < 1, the Crawford game G C (δ) has no V-equilibrium.
Proof: G C (δ) has no pure equilibrium due to the following cycle of improvement steps:
that explain reality better. We have developed a framework for games with players minimizing an (E + R)-valuation V. Our framework enabled proving the strong N P-hardness of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM in the simplest cases of games with two strategies or two players, respectively, and for many significant choices of (E + R)-valuations V.
Besides these central results, our study is making a number of additional conceptual and technical contributions through introducing several new analytical and combinatorial tools and techniques, which are of wider applicability and interest; we summarize here the main ones.
• Our proof techniques have relied heavily on the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, which indicates its computational power.
• We introduced E-strict concavity as the most general known class of valuations with the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
• We imported ν-valuations from Actuarial Risk Theory [18] into the realm of equilibrium computation and revealed some of their algorithmic properties; ditto for higher moments, generalizing the variance considered before in [12, 22] , which were used before as riskmodeling valuations in Portfolio Theory [19] .
• We established the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property, which explicitly identifies a class of games and a corresponding class of valuations where mixed equilibria get "endangered" (cf. [7, 12] ).
Our work opens up a wide avenue for future research towards revealing the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM for other valuations V. Most obviously, the modularity of the proof of Theorem 5.1 may allow, similarly to Theorem 5.12, direct derivation of new concrete complexity results for other valuations that will be shown to have the assumed properties. Enhancing the class of E-strictly concave valuations may yield such new valuations, which may be directly accomodated into the general framework we developed. But new tools and techniques may be required for settling the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM when V is not concave or not E-strictly concave, or when it lacks the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property. It is not clear whether and how our framework could be extended to accomodate even quasiconcave valuations. We conclude with such an example, cast into the context of maximization games.
The Sharpe ratio valuation, formulated as SR = E 1 + SD [27] , is the ratio of a convex over a concave function; although it is not convex, it is quasiconvex as shown in [29] . Does SR have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property? What is the complexity of ∃SR-EQUILIBRIUM?
